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Archaeology and Autonomies:
The Legal Framework of Heritage
Management in a New Bolivia
Donna Yates*
Abstract: The 2009 Bolivian Constitution significantly changed the structure of
the state and paved the way for the creation of regional, local, and even
indigenous autonomies. These autonomies are charged with the management
of archaeological sites and museums within their territory. This article answers
the question of who currently owns the Bolivian past, it stems from concerns
raised at the 2011 renewal hearing of the Memorandum of Understanding
preventing the import of illicit Bolivian antiquities into the United States. By
combining an analysis of recent legal changes related to the creation of the
autonomies and a short discussion of a notable case study of local
management of a Bolivian archaeological site, this article offers a basic
summary of the legal framework in which Bolivian archaeology and heritage
management functions and some preliminary recommendations for
governments and professionals wishing to work with Bolivian authorities at the
state and local level.
BACKGROUND
On 27 June 2011, the U.S. Department of State’s Cultural Property Advisory Com-
mittee1 met to discuss a five-year extension of the bilateral agreement between the
United States and Bolivia, which bars the import of illicit Bolivian archaeological,
ecclesiastical, and ethnographic material into the United States.2 The agreement,
referred to as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), has been in place since
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2001 and is seen as a positive step towards both combating antiquities trafficking
and improving often-strained U.S.–Bolivia relations.3
The agreement is based on mutual commitment: The United States pledges to,
essentially, enforce Bolivian export law by preventing various classes of object from
entering its borders and Bolivia, in turn, pledges to devote significant time and
effort into preventing those items from leaving the country in the first place.4 The
extension of this and any other MOU related to antiquities trafficking prevention
rests on several factors. First, the MOU must still be necessary. A similar MOU
with Canada was allowed to expire in 2002 because sufficient evidence indicated
that the state in question had antiquities trafficking under control.5 Second, the
bilateral agreement must be effective. It takes time, money, and effort to enforce
foreign export law at U.S. borders. If the antiquities-exporting country is unwill-
ing or unable to improve the looting situation on the ground, or if absolutely no
improvement is made despite considerable effort, the MOU will not be renewed.
The 27 June 2011 meeting differed from the previous Bolivian MOU extension
in 2006 in that the United States is now negotiating with a new Bolivia. With the
introduction of a new state constitution in 2009, the former Republic of Bolivia
was reborn as the Plurinational State of Bolivia.6 The most striking feature of the
constitution is the creation of regional, local, and even indigenous autonomies,
each with the ability to self-manage and self-regulate in unique and separate ways.7
The autonomies are now the basic components of a decentralized Bolivian state.
The members of the Cultural Property Advisory Committee expressed both in-
terest in this singular reorganization of a modern state and concern about Boliv-
ian heritage management following autonomization.8 This question was raised:
Can a state that is based on a decentralized model effectively protect the archae-
ological material within its borders?
In an effort to answer this complex question, this article discusses the develop-
ment of Bolivian archaeological law leading up to and following the implemen-
tation of the 2009 constitution. It is possible that the current structure of Bolivian
heritage management established by the law represents an intriguing new spin on
modern heritage management. Bolivian communities, especially autonomous ones,
are charged with taking an active role in their own local archaeological resources.
And by doing so they maintain a sense of connection and vested interest that a
centralized state-level management system cannot inspire. Yet the Bolivian state
maintains ownership of all archaeological material, making it the sole body that
must be negotiated with for international agreements related to archaeological her-
itage, such as the MOU, and it is the legal receiver of repatriated archaeological
material.9 The state also maintains the sole responsibility for the establishment of
best practices for heritage preservation within Bolivia and is given the power to
intervene if autonomies violate these standards. With few comparable case studies
in autonomous management of archaeological sites, it is difficult to gauge whether
such a unique model is sustainable. In a developing country such as Bolivia, this
localized style of site administration might be impossible.
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Whether or not these laws will be effectively implemented remains to be seen.
What is clear is that public knowledge of Bolivian archaeological law, at least out-
side of Bolivia, is nearly nonexistent. The laws themselves are difficult to locate
and impossible to interpret without a clear understanding of shifts in both Boliv-
ian politics and archaeological practice. Heritage organizations and researchers that
operate in Bolivia as well as foreign governments wishing to enter into formal
agreements with that state are do so without access to Bolivia’s archaeological legal
framework. In an effort to combat this lack of information, the following section
provides the basic background of Bolivian archaeological legislation leading up to
the constitutional creation of local autonomies.10
BOLIVIAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL LAW BEFORE THE 2009
CONSTITUTION
Early Archaeological Legislation
Before the creation of the autonomies, Bolivian archaeological law was not sub-
stantially different from heritage legislation in other Latin American countries.11
The basic premise of the Bolivian government’s right to regulate archaeological
material was established in 1906 when the National Congress passed a law that
named the Bolivian nation as the rightful owners of the ruins of Tiwanaku, the
ruins of the islands of Lake Titicaca, and all other ruins from the Inka period and
before.12 This claim of ownership serves as the basic foundation of all subsequent
Bolivian archaeological legislation. In this same early law, the exportation of ob-
jects from Bolivian archaeological sites is prohibited,13 and a 1909 decree clarifies
the portion of the penal code under which antiquities smugglers are to be pros-
ecuted.14 This decree also declares that government permits are required for all
archaeological excavations within the country. Furthermore, in 1938 national own-
ership of all Bolivian archaeological material was formalized in the political con-
stitution of the state, which also reinforced the prohibition on exportation of these
objects.15
Other early Bolivian archaeological laws tackle what seems to have been the
continuing problem of archaeological site looting and antiquities smuggling. For
example, a 1939 law set standards for a newly created General Directorate of
Tourism and specifically charges this body with preventing tourists from remov-
ing artifacts from the country.16 Also, a law passed in 1948 compelled farmers
and road construction workers operating near the site of Tiwanaku to turn over
objects that they found incidentally to the local museum.17 During this time the
national monument scheme was established,18 the site of Tiwanaku was declared
to be a national monument,19 and the national archaeology museum in La Paz
was founded.20
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Professionalized and Nationalized Archaeology
Following the 1952 National Revolution and subsequent social reforms, archaeol-
ogy took center stage in Bolivia, with the ancient past serving as a tool of valida-
tion for the new government. Under the control of archaeologist Carlos Ponce
Sanginés, Bolivian archaeology was both modernized and nationalized.21 Ponce’s
archaeological scheme was undoubtedly nationalistic: The past was used to vali-
date the state and establish a particular idea of Bolivianness.22 Several laws and
regulatory documents from the period reflect this use of archaeology. A 1958 Min-
istry of Education and Fine Arts resolution both formally structured the way ar-
chaeology was to be conducted in the country and imposed a closed-door policy
on foreign archaeological researchers working in Bolivia.23 In theory, foreign ar-
chaeologists were allowed to conduct excavations in Bolivia provided they jump
through a variety of hoops that were not required of Bolivians. These included the
submission of aerial photographs of all sites that they wished to excavate,24 the
donation of 50 copies of any publication that resulted from Bolivian excava-
tions,25 and a promise to “protect the interests of the [Bolivian] State” through the
work they conduct.26 In practice, Bolivian archaeology was to be performed by
Bolivians. This archaeological isolationism would last for nearly two decades.
One significant addition to Bolivia’s heritage management system at this time
was a 1961 Ministry of Education resolution that implemented a national registry
for all archaeological objects held both publically and privately in Bolivia.27 This
resolution was formalized in the 1967 state constitution, which required the Bo-
livian state to keep a registry of all archaeological objects within its jurisdiction as
well as to allot funds to preserve these objects.28 Two decrees expanded upon this
national registry of “cultural treasures of the nation” in 1975. The first created the
Instituto Nacional de Arqueología, which was put under the directorship of Car-
los Ponce,29 and the second gave this organization the responsibility of managing
the constitutionally mandated antiquities registry.30
By the 1970s, aspects of Bolivian law regarding the ownership of archaeological
material were a bit opaque. Bolivian artifacts could (and still can) be privately held
but not privately owned.While an individual may be allowed to house an antiquity
that has been entered into the national registry, the object remains the property
of the nation and cannot legally be transferred or exported. In an attempt to fur-
ther clarify the ownership of cultural property, a 1978 legal decree closed what could
be seen as a legal loophole.While the 1967 constitution stated that private property
could not be expropriated by the state,31 the same constitution stated that archae-
ological objects were cultural treasures of the nation and were, thus, owned by
the nation.32 The question was this: Could archaeological objects resting in private
hands be expropriated? The 1978 decree reinforced the original 1906 claim of state
ownership over archaeological material and clarifies that cultural treasure in pri-
vate hands within Bolivia that is either unregistered or not being taken care of is
a special class of object that is subject to state appropriation.33
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1980s Privatization and 1990s Internationalism
Starting in the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s foreign archaeologists were
again allowed to work in Bolivia. This was facilitated by a general shift in the
focus of Bolivian politics following the fall of both the revolutionary govern-
ments of the 1950s and 1960s and the dictatorships and ruling juntas of the
1970s. In the mid-1980s, Bolivia adopted the now-infamous New Economic Pol-
icy and became an often-cited case study in the use of neoliberal reform and
privatization to combat hyperinflation.34 Archaeology was not a state priority at
this time, and scant archaeological legislation was passed in Bolivia until the early
1990s.35
In the 1990s a more politically stable Bolivia began to participate heavily in
international archaeological and heritage circles.36 In 1988, the Bolivian govern-
ment requested that the United States place emergency import restrictions on tex-
tiles originally from the village of Coroma.37 These textiles, known as kepis, have
religious significance for modern inhabitants of the village, and their export is
clearly prohibited under Bolivian law.38 In 1989 the United States granted this re-
quest.39 To support this agreement a decree was signed in 1990, which stated that
textiles repatriated to Bolivia through the U.S. import restrictions were to be re-
turned to their community of origin.40 This marks the first time that indigenous
Bolivians are specifically mentioned in a piece of archaeological legislation.41 The
success of these emergency restrictions played a large part in the approval of
the previously mentioned 2001 MOU between the United States and Bolivia and
the extension of that MOU in 2006.42
Also during the 1990s, the Bolivian government became interested in partici-
pation in UNESCO, and in 1991 the government referred Tiwanaku for inscrip-
tion on the UNESCO World Heritage list. Tiwanaku’s inclusion on the list was
deferred twice: first immediately following nomination because the World Heri-
tage Committee felt that the boundaries of the protected area were not clearly
defined, and again in 1998 because not enough information was provided regard-
ing the protection and management of the site.43 Meanwhile, the Bolivian site of
Samaipata near Santa Cruz was inscribed on the World Heritage list in 1998.44 In
response to the unfavorable UNESCO rulings regarding the protection plan for
Tiwanaku, decrees were signed in 1998 and 2000 to address specific concerns. These
decrees create the National Commission of Protection, Conservation and Man-
agement at Tiwanaku45 and establish a 100-meter-wide protected perimeter around
the core area of the site.46 In November of 2000, Tiwanaku was finally inscribed
on the UNESCO World Heritage List.47
Although seemingly unrelated to the practice of archaeology in Bolivia, a par-
ticularly notable constitutional change occurred during the 1990s. In 1994 the
constitution was amended to describe the Republic of Bolivia as “multiethnic
and pluricultural.”48 This can be seen as the antecedent to Bolivia’s recent name
change.49
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The “Goni” and Mesa Presidencies (2000 to 2005)
The past decade has been both turbulent and defining for Bolivia. In 2001 Pres-
ident Hugo Banzer Suárez resigned from office, ostensibly because of lung can-
cer. However, political disaster in the form of a series of social upheavals known
as the “Water Wars” no doubt sped his exit.50 In 2002 Gonzalo Sánchez de Loz-
ada Bustamante, known as “Goni,” was elected to his second term as president.51
During this national election, indigenous political groups commanded a substan-
tial percentage of the voter share, and the party MAS (Movimiento al Socialism),
fronted by Evo Morales, lost by less than 2%.52 In 2003 the extended social con-
flicts surrounding the ownership and management of Bolivia’s natural gas re-
serves, known as the “Gas Wars,” came to a head with the violent suppression of
indigenous blockades by the Bolivian military. This was a significant rallying point
for Bolivia’s indigenous majority, and the turmoil led to Sánchez de Lozada’s
resignation from the presidency in October of 2003.53 Carlos Mesa Gisbert, the
sitting vice president, replaced Sánchez de Lozada. He too resigned from the pres-
idency in June of 2005 because of indigenous criticism and public protest.54 The
chief justice of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, replaced Mesa as
president after two other men in the line of succession declined the office.55 A
general presidential election was then held in December of 2005.56
An interesting outcome of the increased success of indigenous movements within
Bolivia at this time was the transfer of the management of the site of Tiwanaku to
the modern municipality of the same name in 2000.57 Yet the majority of archae-
ological legislation passed during Mesa’s short time in office was focused on the
expansion of archaeological tourism. Indeed, nine laws were passed in less than
three years that delineated areas of interest for archaeological tourism, calling for
public and private, national, and international investment in these areas.58 These
laws represent a top-down, investment-centered idea of tourism development and
it is unclear, because of the swiftness of Mesa’s departure from office, if these were
ever implemented.
Early Morales Administration (2006 to 2009)
The election of Evo Morales, who self-identifies as Aymara, as the 80th president
of Bolivia was a singular and defining moment for the country. For the first time
in Bolivia’s turbulent history, an indigenous person was chosen to lead the coun-
try. Although Bolivia has always housed an indigenous majority population,59 it
was only since the implementation of aspects of the 1994 Law of Popular Partici-
pation that indigenous communities were able to front electoral candidates for
higher-level positions.60 Indeed, for most of Bolivia’s existence, social norms and
legal restrictions prevented indigenous people from taking part in Bolivian public
life and the election of Morales represents the first true break from the white oli-
garchy that has ruled Bolivia since independence from Spain in 1825. Further-
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more, Morales commanded a full 53.7% of the popular vote, an outright majority
normally unheard of in a Bolivian election.61 With the power of an outright ma-
jority of Bolivians behind him, Morales felt he had a mandate to substantially
change Bolivia, shaping the country with both socialist and indigenous policies.
He was re-elected in 2009 with an even larger outright majority, 63% of the vote.62
Before the 2009 constitution the Morales administration made no substantive
change to archaeology or heritage legislation. Tourism development was a com-
mon theme in the archaeological laws passed during this period. However, instead
of focusing on inspiring external investment like the Mesa administration did,
Morales-period laws focus more on community-level or sustainable tourism, such
as a decree signed in 2007 that envisions “participatory tourism” as facilitating
“the equitable redistribution of economic surplus.”63 This change in tone can be
seen as a precursor to the wording of the new constitution.
Summary of Bolivian Archaeological Law (1906 to 2008)
More than a century ago, the government of Bolivia declared that all archaeo-
logical remains, even those yet to be excavated, were the cultural property of the
nation and, as such, could not be exported. Over the years this basic claim of
ownership was reaffirmed by both legislation and constitutional amendment. Later
on the government was charged with the maintenance of a registry of archaeo-
logical objects in both public and private hands, and this duty was eventually
entrusted to the archaeological wing of the Ministry of Culture. By the 1990s
Bolivia actively participated in international heritage protection efforts, enacting
internal legislation that facilitated antiquities-related bilateral agreements with
the United States and the inclusion of Bolivian sites on the UNESCO world her-
itage list. In the turbulent early 2000s, the Bolivian government shifted its focus
to the development of archaeological tourism while experimenting with commu-
nity management of the site of Tiwanaku. This focus on archaeological tourism
development continued into the early Morales administration in the form of so-
called sustainable tourism.
What is absent in this summary is a discussion of the actual implementation of
the laws discussed. While Bolivian heritage legislation is rarely contradictory, the
stated goals of many of the laws passed in Bolivia from 1906 until the present are
both lofty and expensive. As various recent archaeological scandals have shown,
compliance with the law has often been poorly enforced. Legal decrees that man-
date various types of development are easily forgotten following major govern-
mental change. A complete account of the implementation of the back corpus of
Bolivian law is outside of the scope of this article. The laws as passed, signed, and
presented, then, represent an idealized framework: a snapshot of how the Bolivian
government viewed archaeology and heritage at any given point in time. Realistic
or not, the laws as written represent how archaeologists and foreign governments
must approach Bolivia on the topic or heritage management.
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ARCHAEOLOGY AND HERITAGE AFTER THE 2009 CONSTITUTION
The new Bolivian constitution, which went into effect on 7 February 2009,64 is a
long and complex document. Through this constitution, the state is officially
refounded, calling on ancient and indigenous claims of authenticity to validate
massive changes to the nationalistic underpinnings of the country.65 The consti-
tution mandates broad changes in the function of the central government. It cre-
ates the possibility of regional, municipal, and indigenous autonomies,66 which
are given the right to a substantial degree of self-management.67 With the creation
of the autonomies, Republican-era terminology is omitted and the country is for-
mally renamed The Plurinational State of Bolivia.68 All indigenous languages are
declared national languages,69 Catholicism is abandoned as the official state reli-
gion and freedom of religion is protected,70 and members of indigenous autono-
mies are granted the right to have their ethnic identity inscribed on their passport
under the heading of nationality.71
Autonomized Bolivia, then, is an entirely new Bolivia, and the right to self-
management granted by the constitution includes a substantial role in the protec-
tion of archaeological heritage. Specifically, autonomous departmental governments
are charged with the promotion and conservation of, among other things, depart-
ment cultural and archaeological heritage.72 Autonomous municipal governments
are charged with the promotion and conservation of municipal archaeological her-
itage.73 Finally, autonomous indigenous groups are charged with the safeguarding
and promotion of their archaeological centers.74
Is Autonomized Heritage Protectable Nationally and
Internationally?
The constitution makes it clear that the autonomies will be key players in the fu-
ture of Bolivian heritage management. The question is, then, how autonomous
are the autonomies when it comes to the protection of Bolivian archaeological
sites and the prevention of illicit antiquities trafficking? How can the stipulations
of such international agreements as the U.S.–Bolivia MOU be enacted and en-
forced in this model? Who exactly owns the Bolivian past?75
I believe that the matter has been significantly clarified by the so-called “Frame-
work of autonomies and decentralization ‘Andrés Ibáñez’ law” passed in July of
2010.76 A portion of this law is entirely devoted to the management of cultural
heritage following departmental, municipal, and indigenous autonomization.77 The
law creates a system of checks regarding the management of archaeological heri-
tage at all levels and the central government retains the exclusive power to define
policies for the protection, conservation, and preservation of cultural heritage.78
The government is charged with monitoring compliance with the archaeological
and preservation standards that it sets.79 It is also charged with the upkeep of the
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formal registry of archaeological objects within the country.80 While the autono-
mies are given wide authority to develop local schemes for archaeological protec-
tion, recording, and conservation, the law clearly states that these local practices
must all fall within the framework of state-level policies.81 In other words, auton-
omies are able to develop regionally specific solutions to their archaeological and
heritage management problems but these solutions are subject to central govern-
ment oversight. The government can and will intervene if their standards are
violated.82
An important aspect of this new structure of Bolivian heritage management is
that one key policy has not changed. The Bolivian nation has not relinquished its
claim on archaeological material, and so the Bolivian government is still the owner
of all discovered and undiscovered Bolivian archaeological remains. The claim made
in the Law of 3 Oct. (1906) (Bol.) still stands. While the autonomies are charged
with managing archaeological sites and objects that fall within their jurisdictions,
they do not own those objects. Taking this a step further, autonomies cannot sell
archaeological objects or destroy archaeological sites, because they simply do not
have the authority to do so.83 International agreements can still be made with the
central Bolivian government regarding the protection of archaeological sites and
the return of Bolivian artifacts because the central government retains ownership
of this type of cultural property.
This form of local management of archaeological remains combined with cre-
ation of basic standards and continued centralized oversight may represent a pos-
itive new preservational structure for a developing country. Bolivia, with its
turbulent political and social history, is the poorest and least developed country
in South America.84 Routing all aspects of the management of archaeological
sites through the central government of a poor state like Bolivia often leads both
to regional inequalities in investment and to mismanagement due to lack of site-
specific protection plans.85 By allowing indigenous groups, municipalities, and
regional governments to become the dominant force in localized site manage-
ment and development schemes, local needs may finally be addressed. The very
people who best understand the nuance of local threats to archaeological sites
are charged with protecting and promoting the past in unique, site-specific ways.86
Also, these communities are positioned to benefit financially from the sites in
their care: Revenue generated from archaeological tourism is retained for reinvest-
ment in the community. If this works, other developing countries may wish to
take note.
CASE STUDY IN LOCAL SITE MANAGEMENT:
TURBULENCE AT TIWANAKU
The key phrase, of course, is “if this works.” Recent events at the site of Tiwanaku
signal that there may be significant points of friction stemming from local control
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of archaeological sites. As previously mentioned, the modern town of Tiwanaku,
which is almost entirely composed of indigenous Aymara inhabitants, was granted
some degree of control over the archaeological site in 2000.87 According to eth-
nographic work conducted by Clare Sammells, the actual division of power be-
tween the municipality and the central government stemming from the 2000 law
was ambiguous.88 The national archaeology service and the Ministry of Culture
were under the impression that the community would have control only of the
tourism-related aspects of the site of Tiwanaku. The community was under the
impression that, while they could not grant archaeological permits, they held veto
power over both who could excavate at the site and where excavations could take
place.89 Basically, the community believed that all activities at Tiwanaku, both ar-
chaeological and touristic, required their approval.
There was no significant challenge to this uncertain situation until July of 2009
when Eulogia Quispe, the mayor of the municipality of Tiwanaku, effectively fired
a group of archaeologists from the national archaeological unit that were working
at the site, citing inferior excavation techniques and questionable restoration work
done on the site’s main pyramid.90 The municipality then hired their own team of
archaeologists to continue working at the site. These archaeologists were to be
paid through a locally administered Venezuelan grant.91 The Ministry of Culture
initially questioned whether the municipality had the legal ability to prevent a
government archaeological project from continuing.92 Based on both the new con-
stitution and the original 2000 law, the community of Tiwanaku felt that such
actions were entirely within their rights as autonomous administrators of the ar-
chaeological site.93
As the extent of the problems at Tiwanaku became clear the Ministry of Cul-
ture came to support the termination of the archaeological project in question.94
Although the Ministry of Culture did not formally acknowledge that the munici-
pality had the right to fire anyone, the Ministry itself fired the head of the na-
tional archaeological service, and the deputy minister of culture in charge of cultural
heritage resigned.95 UNESCO sent several missions to assess damage caused by
archaeological mismanagement of the site and, for a time, Tiwanaku seemed close
to losing its World Heritage status.96 Instead, UNESCO opted to suspend grant
payments to Tiwanaku until the site is brought into compliance with require-
ments set out by UNESCO experts.97 In the aftermath of this scandal, it has come
to light that there may be some serious discrepancies in the formal registry of
archaeological objects under state protection.98
Following these issues, questions as to who controls the site of Tiwanaku
remain. In February of 2011, the Ministry of Culture created the Center for
Archaeological and Anthropological Investigation and the Administration of Ti-
wanaku (Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas Antropológicas y Adminis-
tración de Tiwanaku or CIAAAT) with the aim of meeting the requirements set
by UNESCO.99 In recognition of the stipulations laid out by the 2009 constitu-
tion and the new laws concerning the organization of autonomous governments,
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CIAAAT contains representatives from the Autonomous Departmental Govern-
ment of La Paz, the Municipal Government of Tiwanaku, with some supervision
from the central government through the Ministry of Culture. Through CIAAAT,
the Tiwanaku municipality retains their legal right to manage the site in accor-
dance with government-set base standards of practice.100 This does not sit well
with some sectors of Bolivian society, particularly those who oppose the current
regime.101
THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although conflict related to local versus national control of the site of Tiwanaku
has filled newspaper opinion pages for the past three years, the new model of au-
tonomous management of local archaeological resources is not necessarily flawed.
Indeed, Tiwanaku has always been the exception in Bolivian heritage manage-
ment, not the rule. Tiwanaku is a political space that is symbolic of the Morales
administration, is the most visited archaeological site in the country, and receives
the most attention and funding because of its international fame and World Her-
itage status.102 There are financial, social, and political reasons to squabble over
control of Tiwanaku. No other archaeological site in Bolivia is comparable to Ti-
wanaku and, indeed, no other archaeological site in Bolivia has the same problems.
Tiwanaku is the only Bolivian archaeological site that has been autonomously
managed for a significant period of time, and it is the only case study available for
consultation in the construction of autonomous management schemes for other
Bolivian archaeological sites. Yet information gleaned about the management of
such a unique site is difficult, if not impossible, to apply to other locations. With
no clear rubric for the success or failure of this new management scheme, and
without prior case studies suitable for comparison, observers of heritage manage-
ment under the new system of autonomies are essentially flying blind. Autono-
mous local control of Bolivian archaeological sites may turn out to be a natural
transition or it might create a legal and regulatory minefield.
All told, we are witnessing the creation of a new Bolivia. Although the final
outcome of this experiment is unclear, archaeologists and heritage professionals
need not wait on the sidelines for the dust to settle. It is in the protection of smaller,
more remote, and more vulnerable sites that we will see the successes of manage-
ment by local autonomies. By working directly with autonomous governments to
develop professional and targeted development and protection plans, we may just
see a flowering of creative solutions to local heritage management problems. Agen-
cies and international bodies conducting antiquities-related negotiations with Bo-
livia at a governmental level might find that by placing emphasis on community
stewardship and participation they may catch the current administration’s inter-
est. By focusing on these aspects of Bolivia’s new administrative structure, it might
be possible to craft substantive agreements that will have a lasting positive effect
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF HERITAGE MANAGEMENT IN A NEW BOLIVIA 301
on archaeological site protection and the prevention of looting and antiquities
trafficking in Bolivia.
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Tiahuanaco, is a monumental site located about 70 miles west of La Paz and 15 miles from Lake Titi-
caca in the highAndean plain at more than 12,500 feet above sea level. It was the center of a major cul-
ture with a sphere of influence that included parts of coastal Chile and Perú from approximately ad 300
to ad 1000. It is the most visible archaeological site in Bolivia and is a primary source of symbolic val-
idation for Bolivian political and social movements.Amodern indigenous village with foundations in
the conquest era exists next to the site of Tiwanaku and shares the same name.
13. Thus the exportation of Bolivian antiquities has been illegal since 1906. Archaeological ma-
terial that has left Bolivia since 1906 without the consent of the government has been taken from the
country illegally.
14. Decreto Supremo [hereafter D.S.] of 11 Nov. (1909) (Bol.).
15. BOL. CONST. (1938) art. 163.
16. Decreto Ley [hereafter D.L.] of 24 Nov. (1939) (Bol.).
17. Law of 30 Dec. (1948) (Bol.).
18. Law of 6 Jan. (1919) (Bol.).
19. Law of the National Monument (1927) (Bol.); D.S. of 15 Apr. (1930) (Bol.).
20. Law of 25 Feb. (1945) (Bol.).
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21. See Ponce, Tiwanaku: 200 Años.
22. Ponce was actively involved in MNR, the political party associated with the 1952 revolution.
Janusek has noted that, in Ponce’s view, “all of significance in Bolivia’s pre-Hispanic past was in
some way linked to Tiwanaku state development or military-political control” (see Proyecto Ar-
queológico Jach’a Machaca, Khonkho Wankane). There was a purposeful conflation of the so-called
“Tiwanaku state” with the postrevolutionary Bolivian state. Janusek, “Khonkho WanKane”.
23. Res. Min. Educación y Bellas Artes of 6 Jan. (1958) (Bol.).
24. Res. Min. Educación y Bellas Artes of 6 Jan. (1958) art. 16. (Bol.).
25. Res. Min. Educación y Bellas Artes of 6 Jan. (1958) art. 45. (Bol.).
26. Res. Min. Educación y Bellas Artes of 6 Jan. (1958) art. 7, § a. (Bol.).
27. Res. Min. Educación 1642 (1961) (Bol.).
28. BOL. CONST. (1967) art. 191.
29. D.S. 12302. (1975) (Bol.); National Institute of Archaeology (INAR). This entity later became
the National Directorate of Archaeology or DINAR, and later still the National Directorate of Ar-
chaeology and Anthropology or DINAAR.
30. D.S. 12638 (1975) (Bol.).
31. BOL. CONST. (1967) art. 22.
32. BOL. CONST. (1967) art. 191.
33. D.L. 15900.
34. D.S. 20160 (1985) (Bol.); repealed by D.S. 0861 (2011) (Bol.).
35. Although archaeology was not a government focus at the time, the practice and premise
of Bolivian archaeology came under intense indigenous scrutiny in the 1980s. See Rivera, “La
Antropología y Arqueología,” and Mamani, “History and Prehistory.”
36. Jaime Paz Zamora emerged as the winner of the 1989 Bolivian presidential election because
of an unlikely coalition with political opponent and former dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez. This elec-
tion is generally hailed as Bolivia’s return to relatively stable democracy.
37. Coroma is a small indigenous Aymara village roughly located between the cities of Oruro and
Potosí on the road that leads from Oruro to the Uyuni salt flats, a popular tourist destination.
38. At the very least, the ancient ones were according to both law of 3 Oct. (1906) (Bol.) and
BOL. CONST. (1938) art. 163. It could be argued that kepis that were not ancient were not property
of the nation and were not barred from export by those laws. However, if the modern kepis are not
the cultural property of the nation, they are the private property of the village of Coroma and their
removal and subsequent sale in the United States amounted to the trafficking of stolen goods. See
Constance Lowenthal, “The Recovery of the Aymara Textiles: Textiles Returned,”Wall Street Journal,
9 December 1992, and Sarah Booth Conroy, “Sacred Textiles Returned to Bolivia,”Washington Post,
25 September 1992.
39. 54 FR 10618–10620 (14 March 1989).
40. D.S. 22546 (1990) (Bol.).
41. This is a marked change from prior Bolivian heritage legislation that would most likely have
placed returned objects into the care of the national museum system.
42. 66 FR 63490–63499 (7 December 2001); 71 FR 69477-69478 (1 December 2006).
43. ICOMOS Advisory Body Evaluation No. 567 rev. 2000.
44. UNESCO 22COM VIIIB.1. Commonly called the Fort of Samaipata, this was most likely a
religious center for an Arawak group called the Chané.
45. D.S. 25263 (1998) (Bol.).
46. D.S. 25647 (2000) (Bol.).
47. UNESCO 24COM XC.1. It is worth noting that a specific concern raised by UNESCO was
that a substantial portion of Tiwanaku is inauthentic. In the 1960s and 1970s, substantial portions
of the Kalasasaya temple were fancifully reconstructed to fit with Ponce’s vision of the Tiwanaku
state. These reconstructions are almost universally denounced. See Gasparini, “Mejor Conservar que
Restaurar,” for a scathing period critique of the reconstruction.
48. Law 1585, art 1 (1994) (Bol.).
49. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 1.
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50. See Dangl, The Price of Fire, or Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia, for accounts of recent
Bolivian resource conflicts.
51. Before the 2009 constitution, Bolivian presidents could serve two terms of five years but these
terms could not be sequential. See BOL. CONST. (1967 with reforms and amendments through 2005)
art. 87. The longer presidential tenures and three-term presidents in Bolivia’s history are the results of
either dictatorships or technicalities. Following the 2009 constitution, a Bolivian president is limited
to two five-year terms, and those terms may be sequential. See BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 156.
52. Van Cott, “From Exclusion to Inclusion.”
53. Kohl, “Privatization Bolivian Style.”
54. Albro, “The Culture of Democracy.”
55. The two men in line for the presidency following the resignation of the former vice president
were Hormando Vaca Díez, the president of the Senate, and Mario Cossío, the president of the Cham-
ber of Deputies. Indigenous protesters considered both men to be partisan members of the white
oligarchy, so they were essentially forced to give up their right to assume the presidency.
56. A constitutional mandate forced a general election to be called within a year of the chief
justice assuming the office of the president. See 1967 Const Bol. art 93 § III.
57. Law 2054 (2000) (Bol.).
58. Specifically laws 2527, 2533, 2562, 2580, and 2610 in 2003; D.S. 27607 in 2004; laws 2950,
2966 and 2980 in 2005.
59. Bolivian demographic information regarding the indigenous population is variable. The 2001
national census found Bolivia to be made up of roughly 30% Quechua speakers, 25% Aymara speak-
ers, and 45% Spanish speakers. However, to say that Bolivia is 55% indigenous excludes those who
identify culturally as Aymara or Quechua but do not speak an indigenous language, such as Presi-
dent Morales himself, or people who chose to hide their indigenousness due to racial prejudice.
Bolivia’s National Institute of Statistics numbers the self-identifying indigenous population at 65%,
and it will be exciting to see the demographic figures from Bolivia’s next national census.
60. Law 1551 (1994) (Bol.).
61. In 2005 there were eight official candidates running for the presidency. At the time, if no
candidate commands an outright majority of the popular vote and if no coalition government is
agreed upon, the National Congress of Bolivia would elect the president from the two candidates
who received the most votes.
62. Carrol, Rory. “Evo Morales Wins Landslide Victory in Bolivian Presidential Elections,”Guard-
ian, 7 December 2009.
63. D.S. 2922 (2007) (Bol.); By 2007 sustainable tourism had become Latin America’s develop-
ment buzzwords, a panacea for the problems of poor and indigenous people. It is defined as com-
bining low-impact tourism methods with the funneling of tourism money directly into local
communities. This is often taken to mean that communities should self-manage sites of tourism.
Community self-management at all levels is a primary focus of the Morales government.
64. The constitution was approved by popular referendum and according to Bolivia’s Corte Na-
cional Electoral over 90% of Bolivia’s voting population participated in the referendum. Slightly
more than 61% of voters chose to approve the new constitution. The vote broke largely along racial
lines, for example in the largely indigenous Department of Potosí, 80.07% voted to approve consti-
tution. In the largely white Department of Santa Cruz only 34.75% voted to approve the constitu-
tion (see Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia 2009).
65. BOL. CONST. (2009) preamb.
66. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 1.
67. BOL. CONST. (2009) part III.
68. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 1.
69. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 5 § I.
70. As is freedom of “cosmovision”; BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 4.
71. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 30 § II.3.; An important symbolic move in the autonomization
process. For example “Aymara”may be inscribed legally on a passport, essentially placing an individual’s
Aymaraness alongside their Bolivianness.
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72. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 300 § I.19.
73. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 302 § I. 16 and art 302 § I.31.
74. BOL. CONST. (2009) art. 304 § I.10; the archaeological centers are referred to as “theirs” (the
indigenous group’s) at this point in the constitution. Later law seems to indicate that this is rhetor-
ical: As the original indigenous inhabitants of Bolivia, all archaeological sites are their sites, even if
the state retains ownership of all archaeological material. Archaeological centers are listed with re-
ligious sites in this section of article 304, and they are probably being treated as religious sites. How-
ever, the wording is ambiguous.
75. The debate over who owns the past and, indeed, if the past can even be owned is at the core
of modern heritage management. In the eyes of most legal systems, however, the material remains of
the past can be owned and in Bolivia these remains are owned by “the nation.”
76. Law 031 (2010) (Bol.). The Morales administration names significant pieces of legislation
after symbolic individuals. Andrés Ibáñez was a politician in Santa Cruz in the middle to late nine-
teenth century. He was eventually executing for fostering a short-lived revolution that pushed for an
end to the system of indigenous serfdom that existed in Bolivia at the time.
77. Law 031, art. 86 (2010) (Bol.).
78. Law 031, art. 86 § I.2, (2010) (Bol.).
79. Law 031, art. 86 § I.4, (2010) (Bol.).
80. Law 031, art. 86 § I.6, (2010) (Bol.).
81. Laws 031, art. 86 § II.1 and § II.2 (2010) (Bol.); laws 031, 86. § III.1, and § III.2 (2010) (Bol.);
laws 031, art. 86. § IV.1, and § IV.2 (2010) (Bol.).
82. Exactly how such oversight and intervention will take place is not discussed in this law and
remains to be seen.
83. This issue is of significant concern to archaeologists and heritage professionals, especially in
legal systems that grant individuals and groups complete ownership over archaeological material.
For example, in the United States an individual is legally allowed to destroy most antiquities that
they own.
84. This statement is based on the Multidimensional Poverty Index provided by the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) 2010 Human Development Report.
85. A common complaint made by communities near small archaeological sites or museums,
especially in the developing world, is that money is funneled to major sites with significant tourist
appeal. It is not surprising that, faced with limited funds, poor countries tend to invest in show
pieces. However, this leaves smaller and more remote sites unprotected from all forms of damage,
including site looting, which leads to antiquities trafficking.
86. The argument can be made that these communities may not contain trained archaeological
professionals and, thus, their plans may be inadequate. However, one need not be an archaeologist
to create a competent management plan for a small archaeological site, and this is clearly an area for
government-level oversight.
87. Law 2054 (2000) (Bol.).
88. Sammells, “Touristic Narratives.”
89. From interviews conducted by Sammells, “Touristic Narratives.”
90. “La UNESCO envía expertos para evaluar Tiwanaku” [“UNESCO Sends Experts to Evaluate
Tiwanaku”], La Razón, 22 July 2009.
91. “Cultras despide al director de la UNAR” [“The Ministry of Culture Fires the Director of
UNAR”], La Razón, 31 July 2009.
92. “Tiwanaku consigue que sus arqueólogos sean evaluados” [“Tiwanaku gets their Archaeolo-
gists Evaluated”], La Razón, 25 June 2009.
93. Law 2054 (2000) (Bol.); “Tiwanaku expulsa a excavadores” [“Tiwanaku Expels Excavators”],
La Razón, 23 June 2009.
94. The reader is directed to the editorial pages of any Bolivian newspaper for the more salacious
and unsubstantiated accusations surrounding this scandal.
95. “Ministerio auditará a la Unar y la Dirección de Patrimonio” [“Ministry will Audit UNAR
and the Directorate of Heritage”], La Razón, 1 August 2009. Much of the blame for the situation was
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later placed on the former head of the national archaeological service, Javier Escalante Moscoso. In
July of 2010, Escalante, among other individuals, was charged with criminal offenses stemming from
the Tiwanaku scandal. See “Identifican a responsables de anomalías en Tiwanaku” [“Identification
of those Responsible for Anomalies at Tiwanaku”], La Razón, 25 July 2010.
96. Carroll, Rory. “Makeover May Lose Bolivian Pyramid its World Heritage Site Listing,”Guard-
ian, 20 October 2009. Only two World Heritage Sites out of more than 900 have been delisted: an
Oryx Sanctuary in Oman according to the wishes of the Omani government and the Dresden Elbe
Valley due to the construction of a controversial bridge. The delisting of the Elbe Valley is widely
perceived as a significant embarrassment for Germany. See Kate Connolly, “Bridge takes Dresden off
UNESCO World Heritage List,” Guardian, 25 June 2009.
97. UNESCO 34Com 7B.119; UNESCO 34Com 7B.105. This decision from goes so far as to
recommend a complete moratorium on any archaeological excavation until a more competent na-
tional authority is established for Tiwanaku.
98. “La intervención en la UNAR revela la falta de 611 piezas” [“Intervention at UNAR Reveals
611 Pieces to be Missing”], La Razón, 12 June 2010.
99. “No se puede aún desembolsar fondos para restaurar Tiwanaku” [“It Isn’t Possible to Dis-
pense Funds for Restoring Tiwanaku”], El Diario, 24 May 2011.
100. Mandated, of course, by law 031 art. 86 (2010) (Bol.).
101. For example, see Mesa Gisbert, Carlos D. “Nacionalizar Tiwanaku” [“Nationalize Tiwan-
aku”], Los Tempos, 1 May 2011.
102. A particularly strong example of the conflation of Tiwanaku and the Morales administra-
tion is the use of the site for Morales’s 2006 Apu Mallku investiture ceremony. In garb inspired by
archaeological material (vestments that are now cultural property of the nation according to Ley
3874 of 2008) and standing atop Tiwanaku’s main pyramid, Morales became the official leader of
the Aymara people. This ceremony was performed the day before the official presidential inaugura-
tion as a way to place emphasis on the sense of indigenous authenticity that Morales has used to
validate aspects of his political movement.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albro, Robert. “The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia’s Indigenous Moments.” Critique of Anthro-
pology 26 (2006): 387–410.
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Canada. http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/
cafact.html (n.d.) accessed 18 October 2011.
Dangl, Benjamin. The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia. Oakland, CA: AK
Press, 2007.
Gasparini, Graziano. “Mejor Conservar que Restaurar.” Boletin del Centro del Investigaciones Histor-
icas y Esteticas 16 (1973).
Janusek, JohnW.“KhonkhoWankane.”Website of the Jach’a Machaca Archaeological Project. http://
www.khonkhowankane.org/khonkho_5.html (n.d.) accessed 18 October 2011.
Kohl, Benjamin. “Privatization Bolivian Style: A Cautionary Tale.” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 28 (2004): 893–908.
Kohl, Benjamin, and Linda Farthing. Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resis-
tance. London: Zed Books, 2006.
Mamani Condori, Carlos. “History and Prehistory in Bolivia: What About the Indians?” In Conflict
and the Archaeology of Living Traditions, edited by Robert Layton, 46–49. London: Routledge, 1989.
306 DONNA YATES
Ponce Sanginés, Carlos. Tiwanaku: 200 Años de Investigaciones Arqueológicos. La Paz: Producciones
Cima, 1995.
Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. “La Antropología y Arqueología en Bolivia: Límites y Perspectivas.”América
Indígena 40 (1980): 217–24.
Sammells, Clare. “Touristic Narratives and Historical Networks: Politics and Authority in Tiwanaku,
Bolivia.” PhD diss., Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 2009.
Van Cott, Donna Lee. “From Exclusion to Inclusions: Bolivia’s 2002 Elections.” Journal of Latin Amer-
ican Studies 35 (2003): 751–55.
Yates, Donna. “Archaeological Practice and Political Change: Transitions and Transformations in the
Use of the Past in Nationalist, Neoliberal and Indigenous Bolivia.” PhD diss., Department of Ar-
chaeology, University of Cambridge, 2011.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF HERITAGE MANAGEMENT IN A NEW BOLIVIA 307
